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a b s t r a c t
Cruising-for-parking constraints mobility in urban networks. Car-users may have to cruise for
on-street parking before reaching their destinations. The accessibility and the cost of park-
ing signiﬁcantly inﬂuence people’s travel behavior (such as mode choice, or parking facility
choice between on-street and garage). The cruising ﬂow causes delays eventually to everyone,
even users with destinations outside limited parking areas. It is therefore important to under-
stand the impact of parking limitation onmobility, and to identify eﬃcient parking policies for
travel cost reduction. Most existing studies on parking fall short in reproducing the dynamic
spatiotemporal features of traﬃc congestion in general, lack the treatment of dynamics of
the cruising-for-parking phenomenon, or require detailed input data that are typically costly
and diﬃcult to collect. In this paper, we propose an aggregated and dynamic approach for
modeling multimodal traﬃc with the treatment on parking, and utilize the approach to de-
sign dynamic parking pricing strategies. The proposed approach is based on the Macroscopic
Fundamental Diagram (MFD), which can capture congestion dynamics at network-level for
single-mode and bi-modal (car and bus) systems. A parsimonious parking model is integrated
into the MFD-based multimodal modeling framework, where the dynamics of vehicular and
passenger ﬂows are considered with a change in the aggregated behavior (e.g. mode choice
and parking facility choice) caused by cruising and congestion. Pricing strategies are devel-
oped with the objective of reducing congestion, as well as lowering the total travel cost of all
users. A case study is carried out for a bi-modal city network with a congested downtown
region. An elegant feedback dynamic parking pricing strategy can effectively reduce travel de-
lay of cruising and the generic congestion. Remarkably, such strategy, which is applicable in
real-time management with limited available data, is fairly as eﬃcient as a dynamic pricing
scheme obtained from system optimum conditions and a global optimization with full in-
formation about the future states of the system. Stackelberg equilibrium is also investigated
in a competitive behavior between different parking facility operators. Policy indications on
on-street storage capacity management and pricing are provided.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Cruising-for-parking can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence mobility in congested urban networks. In the city center where road space
is limited, car-users may have to cruise for available parking spots before reaching their destinations. Cruising cause delays
eventually to everyone, even users with destinations outside limited parking areas. For example, according to Shoup (2006), the∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 79 810 3931.
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and the cost of parking (parking fee) closely impact people’s travel behavior, such as mode choice (cars or buses) or parking
facility choice (on-street or garage parking). Therefore, the impact of parking on mobility should not be overlooked and it is
crucial to understand traﬃc dynamics under parking limitations. This paper aims to make effort into this direction by developing
a novel modeling approach to capture the performance of congested multimodal networks with parking constraint. The ultimate
goal is to integrate this approach in an optimization framework to identify eﬃcient parking management policies, for example a
dynamic parking pricing that inﬂuences car user’s mode choice reducing the total delays of all users.
Research in transport economics have proposed road pricing as an effective policy to relieve traﬃc congestion in cities for
many years. Despite the vast scientiﬁc literature, a small number of cities have actually implemented congestion tolls due to
social disagreement and political issues. As an alternative, on-street parking pricing can be an eﬃcient policy, since parking is
priced almost everywhere and its implementation is more straightforward compared with cordon or area-based pricing. The
approach for determining prices should be consistent with appropriate modeling of traﬃc congestion and its dynamics. Pricing
parking can be “imperfect” substitutes of ﬁrst-best pricing schemes, as it is charged at the end of a trip and cannot easily differ-
entiate trip length and routes travelled (Verhoef et al., 1995). Nevertheless, recent advancements in monitoring traﬃcwith smart
sensors combined with proper models of traﬃc congestion dynamics for multimodal systems, could improve the estimation of
the real cost of cruising-for-parking and create eﬃcient and socially-acceptable pricing policies. At the same time, traﬃc mobil-
ity in multimodal systems is inherently a distributed and interconnected process, which should be modeled and managed as a
whole to improve the global operational eﬃciency while avoiding conﬂicting decisions. A commonly-used fully decentralized
optimization approach for traﬃc management is not appropriate for heterogeneously loaded networks with multiple modes of
transport, short links and spillbacks, resulting in the saturation of neighborhood networks (Haddad et al., 2013). In this work we
propose an aggregated and dynamic approach for modeling multimodal traﬃc with the treatment on parking, and we utilize this
approach to design dynamic parking pricing strategies.
Consider a system where travelling by car and searching for an on-street parking is the only available mode of transport (see
for example Arnott and Rowse (2009), Geroliminis (2009), Arnott and Inci (2010), Geroliminis (2015) and Cao and Menendez
(2015b)). Under high traveling and thus parking demand, the system reaches to a stable traﬃc state which is close to gridlock.
Parking will always be full and whenever there is a free spot, it will be occupied immediately by the cruising vehicles. If users
(passengers) have eﬃcient alternative choices (e.g. changing departure time, utilizing a parking garage, switching to public trans-
port) and some of these choices are properly priced, then the systemmight end up in non-gridlock equilibrium states. This paper
investigates the traﬃc dynamics of a system with limited on-street parking, unlimited but priced garage parking and a public
transport alternative. It develops a feedback-based pricing scheme that does not require prediction of the state of the system and
shows that hyper-congestion and cruising can be avoided, almost equally well with a global optimization that requires informa-
tion for the future states of the system. It also investigates how close such a traﬃc management strategy can get to the system
optimum pricing with perfect information of the future conditions of the system. While detailed micro- or agent-based simu-
lations could provide a scenario-based analysis of such a system, we follow a dynamic aggregated approach consistent with the
physics of traﬃc congestion that can contribute to develop physical intuition for such a challenging problem. The approach fo-
cuses eventually on a monitoring-based control, where treatments of behavioral side, such as departure time, are not necessarily
required. Furthermore, incorporating departure time choices will make the solution approach too hard for analytical derivations
and is beyond the scope of the paper.
Extensive studies have been dedicated to address how parking and parking policies inﬂuence people’s mode choice and travel
delay. Representative works can be found in Arnott and Rowse (1999), Anderson and de Palma (2004, 2007), Arnott (2006), Fors-
gerau and dePalma (2013), Qian et al. (2013) and elsewhere. The foundation of these works was the classical bottleneck-model
developed by Vickrey (1969), while researchersmade important extensions of Vickrey’smodel by considering parking constraints
to reveal behavioral changes under parking limitation and parking-related policies. However, few studies discussed the dynamic
inﬂuence of parking on traﬃc ﬂow congestion. In case of insuﬃcient parking capacity, for instance, cruise-for-parking ﬂows
should be treated differently than the normal running ﬂows. Existing analysis on this subject include for instance, Arnott and
Rowse (2009) and Arnott et al. (2015), which took the impact of cruising into account when analyzing parking pricing policies;
Martens et al. (2010) examined the effect of spatial distribution of parking spots on searching-for-parking behavior; Horni et al.
(2013) incorporated parking choice and searching-for-parking behavior model in an agent-based framework with simplistic traf-
ﬁc model; He et al. (2015) derived equilibrium conditions where car users compete for limited parking spaces, and investigated
optimal pricing strategy to drive a system optimum. The aforementioned papers fall short in describing traﬃc dynamics as they
assume static traﬃc states without dealing with the dynamics of traﬃc (e.g. how traﬃc density changes over time) that can be
signiﬁcantly different in the presence of parking limitations. Recent works (Liu et al., 2014; Qian and Rajagopal, 2014) have in-
corporated modeling and pricing parking in the classical morning commute with constant capacity of a bottleneck, which is not
a realistic representation of a downtown city with traﬃc congestion and overcrowding of on-street parking. The treatment on
the physics of cruising-for-parking and the connection between cruising and congestion remain challenging research subjects,
though several recent studies indeed moved toward this direction: Gallo et al. (2011) considered parking costs into account in
their traﬃc assignment model; van Ommeren et al. (2012) carried out an empirical study and reported the diverse features of
the cruising behavior of the Dutch drivers; while Guo and Gao (2012) developed a model to estimate travel time including the
delay from searching for on-street parking place. These approaches either require data that is diﬃcult to collect (e.g. detailed
information of origin-destination and parking availability at destination) or become computationally expensive in large-scale
applications (e.g. microscopic traﬃc or agent-based models) that do not allow for physical interpretation of the analysis. Several
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Fig. 1. A well-deﬁned MFD for a single-mode network.works analyzed the delay caused by on-street curb parking near intersections, see for example in Yousif and Purnawan (2004)
and Cao and Menendez (2015a). Nevertheless, these models cannot be readily applied on large-scale networks either.
For large-scale network application, latest ﬁndings on the low-scattered Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD) show
promising results in modeling the complex dynamics of urban congestion. An example MFD of a single-mode network (e.g. a car-
only network) is displayed in Fig. 1, relating the production of the network (total vehicle kilometers travelled in during certain
time t and the vehicle accumulation in the network) number of vehicles inside the network during t. The critical accumulation
Ncr marks the maximum ﬂow capacity that a network can provide, which is an important property of the network. We will show
later that Ncr signiﬁcantly helps the development of traﬃc control strategies to manage congestion.
Geroliminis (2009, 2015) propose a macroscopic parking model, which is built into an MFD framework to capture the inﬂu-
ence of parking on congestion. This work shows that the MFD-based model reﬂects the dynamics of parking ﬂows in an urban
network, only requiring data that can be practically obtained. Moreover, this work reveals that if cruising-for-parking is intense,
demandwhich is lower than the network capacity can create signiﬁcant congestion due to higher trip lengths. It proposes simple
types of traﬃc management that alleviate the phenomenon of cruising, and shows that perimeter control (restricting the inﬂow
to an inner zone by altering traﬃc signal settings) can signiﬁcantly reduce delay if cruising-for-parking is not so intense and
many trips are not originated from the inner zone; for networks where trips are generated everywhere, pricing is more eﬃcient
than signal control. What is still missing though is an integrated approach, which can be applied for multi-modal multi-region
systems. Furthermore, the impact of spatial limitation and management strategies on multimodal mobility deserves further re-
search effort. Although mode choice was indeed studied by taking into account the inﬂuence of parking availability and cost, see
for example in Li et al. (2007), Zhou et al. (2008) and Liu et al. (2009), the utilized approaches again fall short in the treatment of
cruising and congestion dynamics.
To summarize, the objective of this research is to develop an aggregated macroscopic approach for modeling and controlling
multimodal systems with parking limitation. This approach shall enable the development and optimization of parking pricing
strategies for improving multimodal mobility. A recent study by the authors presents a macroscopic approach to model the
dynamics of a bi-modal (cars and buses) transport system (Zheng and Geroliminis, 2013) without any parking treatment. The
work shows that effective management strategies such as allocation of dedicated-bus-lanes and area-based pricing can be de-
veloped by utilizing a low-scattered bi-modal MFD. A parking module will be integrated into this bi-modal modeling framework
to model cruising-for-parking and estimate cruising delay, where the bi-modal traﬃc movement of traﬃc will be reproduced
by speciﬁc treatment on the car ﬂow families (moving, cruising-for-parking and parked). The pricing strategies range from sim-
ple constant pricing to complex full horizon optimization with perfect information for the system demand and mode choice of
the users, which is expected to lead close to system optimum conditions. While this strategy is considered infeasible for real
implementation, it provides a fair comparison for the eﬃciency of more realistic control strategies.
An elegant feedback time-dependent parking pricing strategy is developed with an objective to maximize the production
of the network and to keep the cruising for on-street parking at low values. Remarkably, such strategy, which is applicable in
real-time management with limited available data, is fairly as eﬃcient as the full horizon optimization. Stackelberg equilibrium
is also investigated in a competitive behavior between different parking facility operators. Our analysis also demonstrates that
feedback pricing functions powerfully even when parking storage capacity decreases and is able to avoid high congestion and
cruising.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology for modeling multimodal traf-
ﬁc system dynamics with parking, extending the work of Geroliminis (2009, 2015). Four subsections are dedicated respectively
on the underlying traﬃc model, parking model, system model and choice model. Different parking pricing strategies are then
developed in Section 3, with the objectives of reducing congestion and the total travel cost of all the users. Cooperative and
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Table 1
List of main variables and parameters.
Variables Units Description
t Time interval index
m Mode of transportm ∈ {os, g, b} (indices represent car with on-street parking, car
with garage parking and bus respectively)
Pm
i
(t) veh-kms Travel production by modem in region i at t
Nm
i
(t) vehs/region Accumulation of vehicles ofm currently in i
Gm
i
(Nm
i
(t)) Production-MFD ofm in i, Pm
i
as a function of Nm
i
Qkm
i
(t) vehs/t Travel demand generated in i and choosingm, with internal or external
destination k
Okm
i→ j(t) vehs/t Vehicular outﬂow (trip completion rate) ofm from i to jwith ﬁnal destination k, k
= i
Om
i
(t) vehs/min Total outﬂow of i, Om
i
(t) =∑
j
Okm
i→ j(t)
Im
i
(t) vehs/min Total incoming ﬂow ofm from the adjacent regions of i to i
NPm
i
(t) pers Accumulation of persons onm currently in i
OPm
i
(t) pers/min Total passenger outﬂow (trip completion of passenger ﬂow)
Nx, i(t) vehs Accumulation of car family x in i (x = r, s, o, g, os) (indices represent running,
searching, outgoing, garage and on-street)
Ox, i(t) vehs/min Outﬂow of car family x to its subsequent family
ωc
os,i
(t)|ωc
g,i
(t) % Fraction of outﬂow of cars using on-street (or garage) parking
ωm
i
(t) % Fraction of the generated demand in i choosing travelling withm
Or → s, i(t)|Or → g, i(t) vehs/t Vehicular transfer ﬂow, from the running family r to the searching family s (or
directly to garage gwithout cruising)
lx, i km Average distance travelled by car family x in i
ξm
i
(t) pers/veh Average passenger occupancy on modem
Nos, i(t) spots Total amount of occupied on-street parking spaces
Ai spots Total amount of on-street parking spaces (constant)
ϕ i(t) % Probability of ﬁnding an available on-street parking space in i
Li(t) km Average cruising distance before ﬁnding an available on-street parking space in i
Tcru, i(t) min Average time spent on cruising
pos(t)| pg(t) $/h Pricing rates for using on-street parking (or garage parking)competitive strategies are analyzed where on-street and garage-parking pricing maximize the same or different objective func-
tions, respectively. Section 4 demonstrates the rationale of the modeling approach with a case study of a typical urban city.
System performances under different parking pricing strategies and parking storage capacities are also evaluated. A discussion
on parking management policies is provided at the end of the paper.
2. Methodological framework
In this section, we present amacroscopic approach formodeling traﬃc dynamics of multimodal systemswith limited parking.
For readability, a nomenclature is provided in Table 1 introducing the main variables and parameters utilized in the later text.
2.1. Multimodal macroscopic traﬃc model
Recent ﬁndings on the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD) signiﬁcantly advance network-level modeling of urban
congestion. The idea of macroscopic traﬃc model for car-only urban networks was initially proposed by Godfrey (1969). The
existence of the MFDwith dynamic features and from ﬁeld data was ﬁrstly reported in Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008), showing
that urban single-mode regions that are homogeneously congested exhibit an MFD relating the production of a road network
(veh-km travelled per unit time) to the network’s traﬃc density. The MFD can be utilized to monitor the performance of road
network, requiring data that can be obtained from the existing information technologies from limitedmeasurement points of the
network (Ortigosa et al., 2014). An interested reader could refer to Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis (2014) and Leclercq et al. (2014)
for a comprehensive review of the recent development on MFD-related theories. Latest works extend the MFD from single-mode
application to bi-modal, where cars and buses share the same infrastructure and look at passenger ﬂow dynamics in addition
to vehicular dynamics (Zheng and Geroliminis (2013), Geroliminis et al. (2014), Chiabaut et al. (2014) and Chiabaut (2015)). The
existence of a mixed-traﬃc MFD and a three-dimensional MFD (3D-MFD) are investigated in these works via micro-simulation
studies. Remarkably, the extended versions of the MFD relate the accumulation (equivalent to traﬃc density) of cars and buses to
vehicular and passenger ﬂows, reﬂecting congestion dynamics under different mode compositions. Note that we assume in this
paper a given production-accumulation MFD, which relates the total distance travelled in region i of mode m (where m can be
any vehicular mode that is either utilizing dedicated road space or sharing space with other modes), the production Pm
i
(t), to the
vehicle accumulations Nm
i
(t). Mathematically, it can be written as follows for single-mode traﬃc (e.g. dedicated lanes separating
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Pmi (t) = Gmi
(−→
Nmi (t)
)
(1)
where
−→
Nm
i
is a vector representing accumulation of all modes utilizing the speciﬁc road infrastructure; Gm
i
is the MFD function
which can be obtained via analytical approximations proposed in Geroliminis and Boyaci (2012) and Leclercq and Geroliminis
(2013) or observed with real data from multiple sensors (Leclercq et al., 2014). Under steady-state condition, the outﬂow (trip
completion rate) of a network Om
i
(t) can be approximated from the production by the following relationship: Om
i
(t) = Pm
i
(t)/lm
i
where lm
i
is the average distance travelled bymodemwithin region i (note that a trip may cross several regions, lm
i
represents the
distance traveled in i). We can also obtain the space-mean travelling speed, vm
i
(t), using its deﬁnition, vm
i
(t) = Pm
i
(t)/Nm
i
(t). The
speed is also required later to estimate the travel time of travelling with modem, which inﬂuences mode choice of the demand.
2.2. Parking model
In this paper we consider a network that contains two typical parking facilities: on-street parking and garage parking. While
we focus on the dynamics of a two-facility system, networks with multiple parking facilities can be integrated in our approach,
given the choices of the car-users on facility and more detailed origin–destination information.
The on-street parking has a total parking spatial capacity of Ai, and the occupied parking space at time t is denoted by Nos, i(t)
(units of both variables are number of parking spots). The available parking space is thus Ai − Nos,i(t) ≥ 0. We assume that the
garage has inﬁnite parking capacity and requires no cruising at the street level (detailed cruising inside a garage is not considered
here, as it makes no signiﬁcant difference for modeling the congestion at street level). Considering limited capacity in the parking
garage is investigated in the last section of the paper.
To reﬂect the impact of parking limitation on traﬃc, a parking model is introduced. A bi-modal MFD model with unlimited
parking such as the one in Zheng and Geroliminis (2013) considers two families of car movements: cars moving towards internal
destination and toward external destinations. We now extend the treatment to three families: (I) Cars running toward internal
destination but not yet require to search for parking Nr, i(t), (II) cars reaching destination and searching for on-street parking
space Ns, i(t) and (III) cars moving toward external destination regions No, i(t). Note that cars of Nr, i(t) that choose garage parking
will be moved out of the system and become outﬂow of the region without cruising, and we do not set up another speciﬁc family
for this ﬂow group. Cars that reach destination and successfully park are denoted by Nos, i(t) and Ng, i(t) for on-street parking and
garage parking, respectively. The interactions among the families will be illustrated later in Fig. 2, when the ﬂow dynamics are
introduced. For simplicity, mode index c (for cars) is skipped in these family notations as buses do not search for parking.
For family (II), the cruising-for-parking process is considered to be repetitive Bernoulli trials, which are expressed by a geo-
metric distribution (number of trials until the ﬁrst success); cruising will continue until an available parking spot is obtained.
The probability that a parking spot is available when being reached, labeled by ϕi(t), is equal to the ratio between the amount of
the available space and the total parking space Ai, ϕi(t) = (Ai − Nos,i(t))/Ai.
The parking spaces are assumed to be evenly distributed around the destinations, with a spacing of si between two adjacent
spots. Alternatively onemay apply a two-dimension cruising model with parking location, provided with detailed data on spatial
distribution of parking spaces and the cruising behavior of cars. This is beyond the scope of this work and is discussed in the
conclusions of the paper. Given the property of the geometric distribution, the mean of the number of parking spaces passed by a
car in family (II) before the car ﬁnds an available parking space is, 1/ϕi(t). The average cruising distance Li(t) thus can be obtained
as si/ϕi(t), given the spacing parameter si.
Knowing the average travelling speed vc
i
(t) obtained from the MFD, the cruising delay Tcru, i(t) can be approximated using the
equation below:
Tcru, i(t) =
Li(t)
vc
i (t)
= si
ϕi(t) · vci (t)
(2)
A more accurate estimation under time-varying conditions is the horizontal difference between the cumulative inﬂow and out-
ﬂow time series (N-curves) of the searching state, which is shown in the case study section. Nevertheless, such an estimation is
more tedious and it makes quite complex the implementation of a feedback pricing strategy, which is based on current but not
predicted information and developed in the next section. Regarding the pricing rates of using the two parking facilities, denote
pos(t) and pg(t) for on-street parking and garage parking when enter the parking facilities at time t. Cruising inside garages is
neglected.
We shall point out that similar models for treating parking limitation do exist. One model can be found in Geroliminis (2009,
2015), where a parking model was built into a single-mode MFD modeling framework to develop a perimeter ﬂow control strat-
egy for reducing parking cost and total cost of travelers. Another model was developed in Arnott and Inci (2010), where equi-
librium conditions under parking constraint (space, duration) are derived for a single-region single-mode and single-parking-
facility system under steady-states. The parking module proposed in this paper is inspired by these literatures, while large
amounts of effort are given on integrating such type of model into a multimodal modeling framework so that parking man-
agement strategies can be designed and tested for inﬂuencing multimodal mobility. Similar state description with simpliﬁed
cruising dynamics has been developed in Cao and Menendez (2015b). The authors also investigate transition probabilities from
different states of the system (cruising, moving) with analytical tools.
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To apply the model, a large-scale city network may require ﬁrstly to be clustered into regions that have different character-
istics. The criteria for the clustering are: (i) Homogeneous distribution of congestion within each region to obtain a low-scatter
MFD (see Ji and Geroliminis (2012) for more details), (ii) a high degree of connectivity and compactness for each region, and (iii)
each region operates a single type of mode usage, e.g. mixed traﬃc or dedicated road spaces everywhere in the region (ongoing
work investigates further the last two criteria (Saeedmanesh and Geroliminis, 2015)). Given accumulation Nm
i
(t), we can esti-
mate the outﬂow of vehicles Om
i
(t), and of persons OPm
i
(t) = Om
i
(t) · ξm
i
(t), provided the average passenger occupancy of mode
m, ξm
i
(t). Given the traﬃc demand generated at time t of m, Qkm
i
(t), the ﬂow dynamics of each region i can be described by
the change of Nm
i
(t) for vehicle ﬂow, and the change of NPm
i
(t) for passenger ﬂow. A discrete version of the dynamics can be
formulated as ﬂow conservation equations (details for differentm is given later).
Nmi (t + 1) = Nmi (t) +
Qkm
i (t)
ξm
i (t)
+
∑
k
∑
j =i
Okmj→i(t) −
∑
k
∑
j =i
Okmi→ j(t) (3)
In (3), demand Qkm
i
(t) is the total demand originated from region i (in passengers per unit time), with internal or external
destinations k and is divided by the vehicle occupancy (in passengers per vehicle of type m). The 3rd term of the RHS in (3)
denotes the total incoming vehicle ﬂow to i from the adjacent regions jwith ﬁnal destination k, while the 4th term is the outﬂow
to all adjacent regions. IPm
i
(t) is the incoming ﬂow in person units. Flow conservation for passengers NPm
i
(t) will have a similar
form. The trip length (travelling distance) of vehicles in region i, lm
i
is considered independent of the destination, thus the transfer
ﬂow is Okm
i→ j(t) = Nkmi · Omi (t)/Nmi . High accumulations in the receiving regions might further constrain the transferring ﬂow.
Ramezani et al. (2015) utilize a boundary capacity constraint, which rarely occurs when smart traﬃcmanagement is present. For
more info the reader is referred to the above reference. A recent work to consider different trip lengths per destination has been
investigated for single regions in Leclercq et al. (2015).
Note that (3) requires a regional route choicemodel to be integrated between origin–destination pairs travelling by car Qkc
i
(t).
This modeling framework should determine the sequence of the passing regions while moving from i to k. Recently such a
modeling framework has been developed for car-only multi-region networks (Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis, 2014; Yildirimoglu
et al., 2015). While the authors believe that integration of route choice in the current framework is feasible, this is avoided. The
main reason is that the route choice involves an iterative procedure to identify region-based equilibrium conditions, which is
computationally diﬃcult to be integrated in a pricing optimization. Thus, the sequence of regions for speciﬁc ODs is considered
known priori. Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis (2014) and Mahmassani et al. (2013) showed that route choice adaptation is more
important under congested conditions.While the pricing strategies that are presented here, are able to avoid such conditions, not
integrating an assignment framework is not expected to signiﬁcantly alter the result, with an important computational beneﬁt
in parallel. The case study described later in the paper involves an example with two regions that ease the dynamics and route
choice description, but still allows to investigate the performance of the pricing strategies under high demand conditions.
To estimate the cruising time for cars, we decompose Nc
i
(t) in Eq. (3) into the three movement families that were introduced
in the previous subsection: Nc
i
(t) = Nr,i(t) + Ns,i(t) + No,i(t). Buses are assumed to have one family of vehicles with external
destinations and no generated “demand”, as buses usually run circular routes across the regions with small time-varying service
frequencies. Eq. (3) without the demand termsQ is suﬃcient for describing the dynamics of buses. Fig. 2 displays ﬂowmovements
of buses and cars with parking choices in region i, with all state variables included. We consider parking limitations for only one
region, but it can be easily extended to multiple regions. One additional complexity might be that multiple regions with parking
limitations would require the addition of a location choice model, with additional cost components (accessibility, distance from
the destination etc.). We expect that a simpler formulation eases the physical interpretation of the results.
Assume ξ c
i
(t) = 1 for all t, the ﬂow conservation of the families I, II, III, and the two families of the parked cars can be written
as follows in Eq. 4(a–e) and illustrated with arrows in Fig. 2:
Nr,i(t + 1) = Nr,i(t) + Qici (t) + Iici (t) − Or,i(t) (4a)
Ns,i(t + 1) = Ns,i(t) + Or→s,i(t) − Os,i(t) (4b)
No,i(t + 1) = No,i(t) + Qkci (t) + Ikci (t) − Oo,i(t) (4c)
Nos,i(t + 1) = Nos,i(t) − Qci,os(t) + Os,i(t) (4d)
Ng,i(t + 1) = Ng,i(t) − Qci,g(t) + Or→g,i(t) (4e)
In Eq. (4a), Qic
i
(t) is the demand traveling internally from region (i to i); Iic
i
is the total incoming ﬂow of vehicles that
end their trips in region i, where Iic
i
=∑ j =i Oicj→i(t). In Eq. (4b),Or → s, i(t) is the transfer ﬂow from running (family (I)) to
searching-for-parking (family (II)), Or→s,i(t) = Or,i(t) · ωcos,i(t), where ωcos,i(t) denotes the percentage of trip-ﬁnishing cars that
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the ﬂow movements in region network iwith parking choices, and the interaction with its periphery (adjacent) region.pursue an on-street parking. The term Qkc
i
(t), Qkc
i
(t) =∑k=i
∑
j =i Qkmi→ j(t), in Eq. (4c) denotes the demand with external desti-
nations indexed by k; Ikc
i
(t) =∑k=i
∑
j =i Okmj→i(t) is the total transfer ﬂow traveling through i; while the last term Oo, i(t) where
Oo,i(t) =
∑
k=i
∑
j =i Okmi→ j(t), represents the outﬂow of external destinations. Eqs. (4d) and (4e) describe the dynamics of the park-
ing ﬂows. Qc
i,os
(t) and Qc
i,g
(t) are the demands generated from on-street and garage parking, respectively. The sum of these two
terms corresponds to the total demand in Eqs. (4a) and (4c), Qc
i,os
(t) + Qc
i,g
(t) = Qic
i
(t) + Qkc
i
(t) = Qc
i
(t). The split of the demand
between the parking facilities is derived in the next subsection through a mode choice model.
The family-speciﬁc outﬂow Ox, i(t), x ∈ {m, g, s, o} can be obtained considering that trip length varies among the different
families:
Ox,i(t) =
Px,i(t)
lx,i(t)
= Nx,i(t)
Nc
i (t)
· P
c
i (t)
lx,i(t)
(5)
where Nc
i
(t) =∑x Nx,i(t), and Pci (t) = Gci (Nci (t)) is estimated by Eq. (1). Variable lx, i(t) is the average distance travelled by family
x in region i at interval t. The family-speciﬁc trip distances lm, i, lg, i and lo, i are considered equal, lm,i = lg,i = lo,i and we simply
denote them as lc. The required cruising distance ls,i(t) = Li(t) is estimated as si/ϕi(t), refer to Section 2.2.
2.4. Aggregated mode choice
To determine the mode split of the newly-generated demand (between car and bus), a Nested-Logit model (see reference
Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire (1999) for a structure of a general Nested-logit model) is applied based on the latest known trip disutility
(cost) C
c, f
i
(t) for travelling with cars choosing parking facility from the set f = {on street versus garage}, and Cb
i
(t) for traveling
with buses. For cars, trip disutility includes travel time, cruising delay and the price of parking. While for buses, trip cost consists
of travel time, accessing time and the discomfort of on-board overcrowding (see in detail in Zheng and Geroliminis, 2013). The
nest is required by the parking facility choice f. Denote ωc
g,i
(t), ωc
os,i
(t), the percentage of mode choice of cars with garage or
on-street parking; and ωc
i
(t) and ωb
i
(t), the percentage of mode choice of cars and buses. We assume the travelers decide their
mode of transport, either car or bus, in the beginning of their trips. Given the current growth of monitoring techniques and the
user information systems, it is expected that travelers can have knowledge of associated costs and make smart mode choices
(including parking facility choice). The travelers are frequent users of the system, thus they can develop such a knowledge with
time, even if less accurate information is available (with a higher uncertainty though), as expressed by higher values in the scale
parameters presented in the next paragraph.
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i
(t) is through a nested logic structure and given in Eq. (6) below:
ωbi (t) =
exp
(
τb ·Cbi (t)
)
exp
(
τc ·Cbi (t)
)
+ exp
(
τc ·Cci (t)
) (6)
whereCc
i
(t) = 1
β
· ln∑n exp (β ·Cc,ni (t)). Scale parametersβ , τ b, τ c are calibrated to avoid unrealistic oscillation inmode shift. By
deﬁnition, ωc
i
(t) = 1 − ωb
i
(t). Given the total demand Qi(t), Q
m
i
(t) can be estimated by ωm
i
(t). Given the car demand generation
Qc
i
(t), Qc
i,os
(t) and Qc
i,g
(t) in Eq. (4) can be obtained.
Note that the car-users have limited knowledge on the possible availability of the on-street parking by the time they start their
trip. Then if they chose to travel by car, when they get in the proximity of the destination, they re-evaluate the costs of on-street
and garage parking (e.g. via parking guidance system), and they make a new decision. If they decide to travel by bus, they do not
have such an option. Therefore the ﬁnal choice on parking facility is determined on-site. While the a-priori and the ﬁnal decision
are the same in the majority of the case, we consider such a framework more realistic. If car travelers remain in the initial
decision of on-street parking, higher cruising times (or even gridlock situations) might be created, especially when on-street
parking becomes full during their trip. The distribution of the arriving ﬂow Or, i(t) between the two parking facilities is estimated
with a Logit model by percentages ωc
g,i
(t) and ωc
os,i
(t), where ωc
os,i
(t) = exp (β ·Cc,os
i
(t))/{exp (β ·Cc,os
i
(t)) + exp (β ·Cc,g
i
(t))}.
The production of Or,i(t) · ωcos,i(t) thus is the input to the cruising family Ns, i(t). The developed mode choice model contains
a small number of parameters that can be estimated with standard procedures (Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999) once data is
available. This should be a research priority.
3. Parking pricing strategies
Road traﬃc networks and management systems constitute a system of systems (SoS) with complex behaviors of various
modes of transport competing for the same space. A common approach of decentralized control design for traﬃc management
is not appropriate for heterogeneously loaded networks with multiple modes of transport, short links and spillbacks, resulting
in the saturation of neighboring networks (Haddad et al., 2013). Lack of collaboration between operators of different systems
(e.g. traﬃc signals, parking facilities, public transportation) can result in sub-optimal (or even worse conditions compared to do-
nothing) because it does not consider interactions and conﬂicts between different networks and transport modes. The modeling
of the previous section allows for the investigation of holistic traﬃc management schemes based on pricing of on-street and
garage parking. The historical administrative organization of metropolitan areas has led road systems to be operated by a patch-
work of different systems without proper level of communication in exchange data and actions. Most importantly, they are often
competing with one another to avoid congestions on their respective networks. These systems and operators are rather closed
with little information shared between them, both for technical reasons and lack of motivation to share strategic information.
Traﬃc systems, being inherently a distributed and interconnected process, should bemanaged as a whole to improve their global
operational eﬃciency while avoiding conﬂicting decisions. MFD-based traﬃc management strategies serve for this sustainable
and global mobility goal. Recent studies have demonstrated the performance of such strategies, examples including congestion
pricing (Zheng et al, 2012; Simoni et al., 2015), space allocation for bus lanes (Zheng and Geroliminis, 2013), and dynamic traﬃc
signal perimeter control (refer to Ramezani et al., 2015 for a review).
We investigate now an MFD-based parking management, with two dynamic pricing strategies P1 and P2, to determine on-
street parking pricing rate pos(t) and garage pricing rate pg(t) such that the congestion of traﬃc and cruising-for-parking are
reduced. We assume to have full authority of both prices whereas in reality they belong to parties with different operating
objectives (and competition might occur). Therefore we further introduce an optimization procedure to determine the prices
when competition exists between on-street parking and garage parking operators. Pricing is only applied in the center region
which suffers more congestion, note that a region index is omitted from the above pricing variables. Strategy P1 considers
that the dynamic evolution of the system is perfectly known and solves a single full-horizon optimization problem to mini-
mize the total costs experienced by all passengers. While such an approach can provide close to system optimum conditions,
it is also diﬃcult to implement due to lack of accurate prediction and high computational effort to solve a highly non-linear
problem. Nevertheless, it gives an upper limit for comparison purposes with more feasible strategies like a feedback based P2
strategy.
Strategy P2 develops a generic control-loop feedbackmechanism. It tries to succeed two set points, related to (i) themaximum
production of the network (in terms of vehicle-kilometers travelled per time interval) and (ii) small cruising time for on-street
parking. This strategy calculates an error value as the difference between a measured process variable and the desired set point.
It attempts to minimize the error by adjusting the prices pos(t) and pg(t).
Then, strategy competition describes the competition behavior between the two parking operators, where one operator reacts
to the decision of the other operator and determines the best pricing rates to maximize each objective with certain tolerance.
This interactive process is assumed to last until, if exists, a convergence reached between the two competitors.
3.1. Strategy P1: A system optimum parking pricing scheme
This strategy aims at achieving a system optimum. The goal of this pricing scheme is to minimize the total passenger cost
(TPC), including travel time, cruising time and parking fees, and serve the total network demand. The control variables are parking
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implemented due to prediction limitations and day to day variations of demand. Mathematically it can be described as the
following in Eq. (7):
min
pos(t), pg(t)
ZP1−A =
∑
t,i,m
TPCmi (t) =
∑
t,i,m
(PHTmi (t) + Tosci (t) + Tgci (t)) (7)
where the total passenger hours travelled (PHT) can be easily estimated given the accumulations in Eq. (3). Tosc
i
and Tgc
i
are the
total parking tolls of on-street parking and garage parking, respectively. Both terms can be calculated given the pricing rates pos(t)
and pg(t), and the number of users by Eq. (5). Let us refer (Eq. (7)) as P1-A.
We also introduce a P1-B strategy, as written in Eq. (8), where the prices are determined only to optimize the total travel time.
min
pos(t), pg(t)
ZP1−B =
∑
t,i,m
PHTmi (t) (8)
We will compare and discuss later the eﬃciency of the two schemes. Traditionally from an economic prospective, pricing is
considered a transfer of money from one entity to another (e.g. from car travelers to system operators) and this amount could be
utilized to improve the service of more sustainable modes, e.g. like public transport. While the literature review of pricing is vast,
pricing implementations are limited and this is because people are reluctant to pricing and user acceptability is questionable. In
this work we are interested in considering strategies, where the amount of toll paid is included in the optimization, so that these
strategies becomemore attractive and have a more socially-oriented objective. Results will highlight some interesting properties
of such integration.
Problems (7) and (8) are subject to the system dynamics introduced in the previous section. We also add a constraint that
pos(t)<pg(t). The reason is the following: Since on-street parking requires cruising time and garage capacity is considered inﬁnite,
without imposing this constraint, the cost of garage parking would be always less and the optimization will consequently rule
out the option of on-street parking. The optimization problems (7) and (8) are highly non-linear. We solve these problems by
sequential quadratic programming (Nocedal andWright, 2006).We apply this algorithm formultiple initial values (around 1000)
to avoid convergence to local minima, which might be the case for a non-smooth objective function.
3.2. Strategy P2: A congestion- and cruising-responsive feedback parking pricing scheme
This pricing scheme is designed to reduce both traﬃc congestion caused by cars in general and by the cruising traﬃc. The
linear control theory offers a number of methods and theoretical results for feedback regulator design in a systematic and eﬃ-
cient way. Feedback type controllers of PID type have been widely applied in freeway traﬃc ﬂowmanagement, e.g. Papageorgiou
and Kotsialos (2002) as the core control law to control ﬂow entering from on-ramp to main freeway. Stability analysis has shown
the global convergence of the controllers: “For all choices of parameters, the strategy preserves closed-loop stability and forces
the actual control variables to reach the desired one” (Kosmatopoulos and Papageorgiou, 2003). Recently, similar strategies have
been introduced for MFD perimeter control for multiple regions (Aboudolas and Geroliminis, 2013 ; Keyvan-Ekbatani et al., 2015;
Haddad, 2015). The purpose of these strategies is to retain accumulation of vehicles at a desired level that maximizes system out-
ﬂow, without the direct need for demand information or prediction. The regulators are strictly based on real-timemeasurements,
without any need for online model or demand predictions. A state feedback controller based on occupancy information has been
recently introduced formultiple parking locationmanagement, without treating cruising-for-parking (Qian and Rajagopal, 2014).
Nevertheless, for the problem formulation of the previous section, controlling only the accumulation of cars will not resolve the
problem of congestion as cruising-for-parking signiﬁcantly contributes as well. Here we intend to apply the same principle as
in urban traﬃc management, where the difference (and the major diﬃculty) come from the facts that (A) pricing affect user’s
choice, whereas in the ramp-metering or network-level entry metering case users have to obey the controlled traﬃc signals, and
(B) the controller that determines the dynamic pricing for inﬂuencing mode choice and parking facility choice, aims to achieve
two control objectives simultaneously which experience correlation. Point (B) is challenging and innovative, given that such
control scheme is rarely reported in the traﬃc management literature. We will demonstrate later that this controller functions
effectively in reducing both the general congestion and cruising delay.
To provide an overview of the developed feedback control scheme, Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of the control logic. The con-
trol problem is to regulate the number of vehicles cruising for parking and the total number of vehicles moving in the city center
to maintain them around selected set-points (indicated by the red arrows in Fig. 3), respectively, via appropriate manipulation of
the prices of on-street and garage parking, pos and pg. The prices will inﬂuence mode choice in the beginning of the trip, where
the demand of the center region, Qi
i
, is split into Qic
i
and Qib
i
(same applies for the demand from periphery regions with center
region i as destination, as travel cost of all passing regions are taken into account). They will also inﬂuence the on-site parking
facility choice, when the outﬂow from Nm will become either part of Ns searching for on-street parking spot or directly parking in
the garage. Please note that although the enforcement of pricing strategies will affect the individual choice behavior of users, the
collective traﬃc ﬂow dynamics follow the MFD, the shape of which is not very sensitive to the slow timely-varying behavioral
changes. This property allows the MFD to provide reliable information on system performance and to determine the optimal
prices in real-time. It becomes more complicated, however, if routing strategies are implemented. This is because routing may
inﬂuence the trip lengths of users which have direct impact on the MFD (Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis, 2014). In addition, we
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Fig. 3. A block diagram of the proposed pricing controllers.consider that demandwith destination outside of the center region where there is no parking limitation is not affected by pricing
as they will not be subject to paying a price, thus can be considered as disturbance to the controlled system (the top part of the
block diagram).
Now let us describe the control logic for pricing in more detail. Car users will pay a parking fee based on the magnitude of
congestion they cause at the moment they enter the network. A feedback-type I (integrated) controller is employed to update
the time-dependent prices pos(t) and pg(t), where the control variables are the total accumulation N
c(t) and the accumulation of
cruising family Ns, i(t). Eqs. (9) and (10) describe mathematically the two control mechanisms respectively, where c1 and c2 are
control gain parameters:
pg(t + 1) = pg(t) + c1(Nc(t) − Ncr) (9)
pos(t + 1) = pos(t) + c1(Nc(t) − Ncr) + c2
(
Ns(t) − NsT
)
(10)
The concept is that garage users have to pay for the hyper-congestion due to large accumulations of cars in the network,
while on-street users have to pay for the cost of cruising as well. In this way, both types of congestion can be eliminated.
Eq. (9) states that the garage price for the next time interval, pg(t + 1), increases if the accumulation of car users Nc(t) exceeds
the critical accumulation of the network Ncr. Recall that Ncr is the point in the MFD, where the maximum network production
is reached and network production decreases if Nc(t)>Ncr, see in Fig. 1. A slightly smaller value is chosen, e.g. 0.95 Ncr, to fa-
cilitate stability of the system around the set point. Eq. (10) states that the on-street price pos(t + 1) charges the same amount
for the congestion, and an additional amount for causing cruising delay which is proportional to the difference between Ns(t)
and a pre-deﬁned threshold NsT. Parameter NsT can be interpreted as the tolerated amount of cruising vehicles, which reﬂects
the level of cruising delay. Cruising time is considerably small for a wide range of values of Ns, the number of cruising vehicles.
Thus, NsT is chosen to keep the value of cruising at a reasonably low value (e.g. less than 2 min). Having c1 parameter in both
(9) and (10) simply means that all car users have to pay for congestion independently of the parking choice. If c2 = 0, then these
strategies are similar to the existing ones in the literature, but the large disturbance generated by cruising-for-parking will not
allow the system to converge in the desired accumulation threshold. Good values of regulator gain may be found with appro-
priate Control Engineering methods or manual ﬁne-tuning; feedback regulators are quite robust to moderate parameter value
change. Strategy P2, in contrast to P1, does not require any prediction and is based only on quantities that can be estimated with
sensing techniques. Our analysis shows that even under perfect information, the performance of P1 in terms of PHT is the lower
bound that P2 can reach, when uncertainty is added in the P1 demand and mode choice, P2 outperforms P1, which also has a
high computational burden.
Regarding the choice of Ncr and NsT, they can be seen as policy factors inﬂuencing the service level of general mobility and on-
street parking, respectively. One may argue that if lower values are chosen, the toll is very strict and over-charging might occur
as the system operates in a state less than its capacity. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily indicate over-charging unless the
total toll paid outweighs the total savings in travel time. System operator can choose the desired values in a way to maximize
traﬃc ﬂow and as a result to transfer the highest possible number of passengers with small delays. The value of toll which results
in points in the MFD just without the decreasing branch can be set as the lower bound, while the one which results the total
toll paid just equal to total travel time savings can be set as the upper bound in order to avoid over-charging. This higher toll
will push the system to operate at a smaller than the maximum ﬂow during the toll period, but with higher average speed and
some potential savings in travel delay. This also implies that an operator can utilize a slightly smaller value to guarantee a more
reliable operation, e.g. capable of buffering if there is sudden disturbance from demand, though fewer users are served, as ﬂow
decreases (see for example Geroliminis and Levinson, 2009).
46 N. Zheng, N. Geroliminis / Transportation Research Part B 83 (2016) 36–58
Fig. 4. A graphical illustration of the pricing competition process between the two parking operators.3.3. Strategy competition: An interactive two-player pricing competition
Note that in P1 and P2, we assume that a central decision-maker operates both parking facilities and has full power to de-
termine pos(t) and pg(t). In practice, the authorities belong to different operators. City policy-makers operate on-street parking
while private companies operate garage parking. These operators might have different objectives, e.g. city tries to minimize TPC
by controlling the price of on-street parking, while garage operator maximizes its proﬁt, the revenue beneﬁt of garage pricing,
denote it BG, by controlling the price of garage parking. Then the optimization problem can be re-formulated as the follows:
min
pos(t)
TPC =
∑
t,i,m
(PHTmi (t) + Tosci (t) + Tgci (t)) (11a)
max
pog(t)
BG =
∑
t,i
Tgci (t) (11b)
It can be seen that direct conﬂicts, represented by the term Tgc
i
(t) in Eqs. (11a) and (11b), exist between the two operators. This
pricing competition can be viewed as a responsive and negotiate-alike process, where each operator changes the pricing strategy
after recognizing the impact of the other party’s action. In game theory, these types of problems are known as differential games
that try to analyze conﬂicts in dynamical systems. Differential game models have been used extensively to study problems of
conﬂict arising in such diverse disciplines as operations management, marketing, and economics. Of great attention are the
Stackelberg differential games (Bagchi, 1984). The leader announces its control path, i.e. on-street pricing for the time horizon of
our problem. Then, the follower decides its optimal control path in response to the announced pos(t). Stackelberg equilibrium is
obtained when the leader solves its problem taking into account the optimal response of the follower.
We consider solving the formulated parking competition by a leader–follower optimization procedure, where the policy-
maker as the higher level leads the process and the companies at the lower level follows. Given the complexity of the optimization
problem, we follow an iterative process with an objective to converge to a ﬁxed point with small error. At each competition
round, each operator tries to optimize its own objective given the action of the previous one. To avoid oscillatory behavior of the
optimization procedure andmimic the acceptance boundary of the parties during negotiation, we add constraints that the actions
of the one optimization problem should not worsen the other problem by more than 20% compared to the previous iteration.
A graphical illustration of this process is displayed in Fig. 4. Comparing to the existing applications of bi-level optimization in
transport-related researches, such as in Yin (2002), the challenges here are two-fold: (i) The two objective functions have direct
conﬂict, given that Tgc
i
(t) is in both objective functions, and (ii) if there exists a ﬁxed point where the two operators cannot
improve their proﬁt, i.e. the ﬁnal values of the both objective functions vary within 1% of the previous round of the competition.
Results are presented in the following section.
4. Case study and analysis
The different pricing strategies are tested in a concentric two-region bi-modal network, which is governed by the dynamics
as described in Sections 2.1–2.4 by Eqs. (1)–(6). Denote “1” and “2” for the center and the periphery regions, respectively. The
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N1c1 (t + 1) = N1c1 (t) + Q1c1 (t + 1) + O1c2 (t) − O1c1 (t) (12a)
N2c1 (t + 1) = N2c1 (t) + Q2c1 (t + 1) − O2c1 (t) (12b)
N1c2 (t + 1) = N1c2 (t) + Q1c2 (t + 1) − O1c2 (t) (12c)
N2c2 (t + 1) = N2c2 (t) + Q2c2 (t + 1) + O2c1 (t) − O2c2 (t) (12d)
Then the regional accumulation can be deﬁned as Nc
1
(t) = N1c
1
(t) + N2c
1
(t) and Nc
2
(t) = N1c
2
(t) + N2c
2
(t). Eq. (12a) dictates that
the change of the accumulation of the running traﬃc that generated from region 1 with destination region 1 (internal traﬃc), is
the sum of the demand entering the network (the 2nd term RHS) and the transfer ﬂow entering region 1 from region 2 (the 3rd
term RHS), minus the transfer ﬂow (the 4th term RHS) reaching the destination in region 1. While for external traﬃc, Eq. (12b)
captures a similar form with (12a) except that travelers ﬁnishing their trip in region 2 and starting travelling in region 1, will all
ﬁnish in region 1 not returning to region 2 (assuming no cross-region trips). Eqs. (12c) and (12d) can be interpreted as above.
While for buses, only two dynamic equations are needed, because in general buses serve across regions over time:
Nb1(t + 1) = N2b1 (t + 1) = N2b1 (t) + O1b2 (t) − O2b1 (t) (13a)
Nb2(t + 1) = N1b2 (t + 1) = N1b2 (t) + O2b1 (t) − O1b2 (t) (13b)
For passenger ﬂow dynamics, similar laws apply given the passenger occupancy information. The parking dynamics
Eqs. (4a)–(4e) remain unchanged, given that only the center region (i = 1) has parking limitation.
Mixed traﬃc of buses and cars occurs in the outside region (periphery), while a fraction of road space in the center region
(center) is pre-determined and dedicated to bus usage only. This fraction is estimated by an optimization approach with an
objective to minimize system delays where cruising is negligible and pricing is absent (the interested reader could refer to Zheng
and Geroliminis, 2013). We simulate an urban road traﬃc system during a typical morning period for 4 h (at a 3-min time step, in
total 80 time units). 1Travel demand has a symmetric trapezoidal shape with time and the length of peak period equal to 1 h. A
70% fraction of the demand generated in the periphery will travel to the city center and the 70% fraction of the demand generated
in the city center will remain. A mixed bi-modal MFD for the periphery and two single-mode MFDs for the center are estimated
with Variational theory based on Boyaci and Geroliminis (2012) and Leclercq and Geroliminis (2013), for a grid network with the
following settings: (i) two-lane one-way roads with block lengths 154 m and 308 m in the two regions respectively, (ii) signal
settings for all intersections, green of 40 s; cycle of 90 s and offset of 0 s, (iii) a triangular fundamental diagram for each link with
free ﬂow speed for buses and cars15m/s; jam density 0.15 veh/m for cars and 0.05 veh/m and congestedwave speed for buses and
cars, 5m/s. The functional form of the MFD for the center region: (i) Pc
1
(t) = 0.16e−22.76
Nc
1
(t)
β ·LT · Nc
1
(t) for Nc
1
(t) < Ncr(Ncr = 0.15β ·
LT ), and else P
c
1
(t) = 0.13β · LT − 0.87Nc1(t), where β · LT is the β percentage of the total-lane-km length allocated to the car
network; (ii) Pb
1
(t) = 0.16e−72.74
Nb
1
(t)
(1−β)·LT for Nb
1
(t) < Ncr
b
(Ncr
b
= 0.05(1 − β) · LT ), and else Pb1 (t) = (1.52 − 30.48
Nb
1
(t)
(1−β)·LT )
Nb
1
(t)
(1−β)·LT .
We consider two values for β , 95% for off-peak and 85% for off-peak hour (thus β(t)), assuming dynamic space allocation strategy
is applied. Two modes of transport are considered available in the system, car and bus. We assume that a fraction 10% of the
users are captive bus users and do not have access to cars. The average distance between on-street parking spaces si = 20m. The
duration of on-street parking is 1 h. A sensitivity analysis on parking duration will be reported in the next section (Section 5.3).
The MFD forms are consistent with empirical and simulated ﬁndings from Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008) and Geroliminis et
al. (2014).
In the subsections below, we show the dynamics of the two-region bi-modal system under parking limitation and pricing,
illustrating the mechanism of the developed model. Through Sections 4.1–4.4 we present a performance comparison of ﬁve
parking pricing policies: A base scenario with free on-street parking, a ﬂat parking-rate scenario for both garage and on-street,
Strategy P1 (A and B) and Strategy P2. The base scenario applies a time-constant parking garage fee pg, which creates crowding
for the cruising traﬃc. The ﬂat-rate scenario estimates constant values of pos and pg by minimizing objective function (7). Given
these results, the last Section 4.5 utilizes the proposed approach to reproduce the pricing competition dynamics between the
parking authorities with different management goals.
4.1. System dynamics with constant pricing
Fig. 5 illustrates the system dynamics of the center region (the region index is skipped in the text), under an optimal ﬁxed-
pricing schemewhere the prices are obtained through optimization, minimizing the total cost of the users, see objective function1 The choice of the time step in this paper (3 min) is consistent with the existing literature based on empirical observations, that show little scatter in the
MFD shape, for homogeneously congested regions. Measurement errors (in the range of 10%) in the MFD function in the dynamic equations, do not inﬂuence the
performance of pricing.
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Fig. 5. System dynamics and traﬃc performance under the optimal constant parking pricing scheme for the center region: (a, top left) mode share of the three
modes and total travel demand over time, (b, top right) the MFD of the center region car network with congestion observed, (c, down left) the pricing rates of pos
and pg , and (d, down right) average cruising time and the free parking space over time.of Eq. (9) without a time index for the decision variables. The optimal prices are pos = 0.4 $/h and pg = 1.6 $/h (Fig. 5(c)). Fig.
5(a) shows the time series of total demand and the mode share for buses, on-street and garage parking. It can be observed that
mode share of buses increases during peak-hour as traveling with car experiences higher travel costs than bus. Garage parking
is chosen only after congestion builds up and on-street parking is saturated with high values of cruising (around time 9:30).
From the outﬂow-accumulation MFD in Fig. 5(b) (with the critical accumulation Ncr = 5200veh and a decreasing branch up to
Nc(t) = 9000 veh for car network), we can clearly see that the car network experiences congestion. Judging from the time series
of cruising delay in Fig. 5(d), cruising-for-parking contributes to the high travel cost of cars as well. Nevertheless, even if demand
is high, on-street parking is not fully occupied because travelers have alternatives of lower total cost (e.g. public transport or
garage parking with fee). Note that such a static pricing scheme cannot avoid neither congestion nor cruising. The travel cost of
buses remains nearly the same since buses operate on the dedicated lanes with scheduled frequencies, although a slight increase
can be found in Fig. 5(d) during the peak-hour, which is a reﬂection of speed reduction due to the longer dwelling time for
boarding more passengers. Congested states can be observed in the MFD in Fig. 5(b), where different values of outﬂow occur for
the same accumulation. The reduction of outﬂow can be explained by the reduction of on-street parking availabilities. As cars
have to cruise longer distance to compete for a parking space, the outﬂow drops accordingly (recall that outﬂow is production
over trip length). This analysis is convincing for the need of more advanced pricing schemes to eliminate cruising and states in
the decreasing (congested) part of the MFD.
4.2. System dynamics with strategy P1-A
Now let us examine the performance when dynamic pricing strategy P1-A is applied. The goal of this pricing scheme is
to minimize the total passenger cost (TPC) shown in Eq. (9), including travel time, cruising time, parking fees controlled by
a central operator with a full knowledge of the system. Prices can vary every 15 min (5 interval units). The same graphs of
Fig. 5 are reproduced and displayed in Fig. 6. Evidently, the cruising delay and accumulation decrease signiﬁcantly (see Fig. 6(b)).
Higher maximum outﬂow can be observed from the MFD (nearly 1500 in this case, versus 1200 in the ﬁxed pricing case). With
a careful investigation on the resultant mode shares of bus, we conclude that the large improvement of performance under
strategy P1-A is due to its capability of triggering an earlier mode shift from cars to buses during the on-set of the peak-hour.
Remarkably, such small change (roughly a mode share difference of 2% during 20 min) in the mode share creates signiﬁcantly
different traﬃc performances. Furthermore, it should be highlighted that less toll is charged on the users by strategy P1-A.
Nevertheless, during the optimization the travelers’ choices and traﬃc states are perfectly predicted for the whole horizon,
which is unrealistic. Imperfect information and lack of accurate modeling of traﬃc states and user behavior can deteriorate the
performance of pricing.
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Fig. 6. System dynamics and traﬃc performance under the optimal strategy P1-A. The same graphs are reproduced as in Fig. 5..4.3. System dynamics with strategy P2
Fig. 7 illustrates the resultant system performance under the feedback-type time-dependent pricing strategy P2. Similarly as
P1 strategies, prices are controlled every 15 min. Fig. 7(a) plots the number of cruising vehicles Ns versus cruising time Tcru for
each time period for the no-pricing case. Note that for a range of Ns the cruising time is quite small (< 1 min), that allows the
development of an eﬃcient feedback control strategy that eliminates both cruising and congestion. For the applied strategy P2
here, the objective is to control the cruising delay Tcru under 3 min, therefore we choose a value of 900 veh for N
sT. Regarding
Tcru, it may be monitored directly from existing data collection technology and used to control the price on cruising. Parking-
behavior-related studies, e.g. Martens et al. (2010) have considered that cruising traﬃcmakes circular movements within certain
local blocks around their destinations. Provided with the high-resolution GPS data, trajectories of vehicles can be reproduced.
With such information, the cruising-for-parking part of a trip can be distinguished from the normal running part (constructing a
model to estimate cruising time then is feasible). Alternatively, a system where the driver requires a shortest path route through
existing navigations, could integrate the information of the destination to identify when vehicles start cruising. Fig. 7(d) displays
how the accumulations Nc(t) and Ns(t) ﬂuctuate closely around the critical values N
cr and NsT, though there are a few cases where
congestion exceeds the desired states. This shows consistency of the developed controller with the expected system dynamics,
even if the disturbances of the system are non-zero. Fig. 7(b) shows the Outﬂow-Accumulation MFD pairs during the simulation,
with no points in the congested regime. In Fig. 7(c), the time-dependent pricing rates pos(t) and pg(t) are plotted. The average
pricing rates are found slightly higher during the peak hour, compared to Strategy P1-A.
To provide additional insights on how different pricing strategies inﬂuence the dynamics of the general and the cruising
conditions, we employ oblique N-curve plot to identify the temporal traﬃc patterns. N-curves display cumulative vehicle count
versus time at different locations (Moskowitz, 1954). For network analysis with multiple origins and destinations, they can rep-
resent the cumulative counts of different states. Oblique plots have been extensively utilized in traﬃc engineering analysis and
ﬁrstly introduced by Cassidy andWindover (1995). Instead of plotting the cumulative N-curve across time a constant background
is subtracted at every time period, q0. Thus, the plot shows the cumulative ﬂow minus q0 · t. This simple transformation is for
illustration purposes to highlight differences between curves in the same ﬁgure, as otherwise differences are not visible due to
high values of cumulative variables over time. Note that the accumulation of a state variable can still be measured by the vertical
distance between two curves at a speciﬁc time instant, but the travel time should now be measured along one of the overlaid
oblique lines.
Fig. 8 displays the graphs for the three pricing strategies under discussion: (a) Constant pricing, (b) P1-A and (c) P2. Each graph
contains three oblique cumulative N-curve time series for (a) demand for on-street parking (when they enter the network), (b)
the transfer ﬂow from running state to cruising state (when cruising starts) and (c) the transfer ﬂow from cruising state to on-
street parking (when they ﬁnd on-street parking). An oblique distance between the solid black line on the top and the dashed
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Fig. 7. (a, top left) relationship between cruising delay Tcru and cruising vehicles Ns in a non-pricing scenario which is utilized to identify the critical cruising
accumulation NsT; System performance by strategy P2: (b, top right) the MFD of the center region car network, (c, down left) the prices of pos and pg , and
(d, down right) the evolution of accumulations with the desired states in dotted lines: upper red for critical accumulation Ncr and magenta for the cruising
threshold NsT .
Table 2
Comparison of the performances of different pricing schemes.
Saving in PHT (h) Total toll (h) Toll eﬃciency (ratio: sPHT/TTP) Ave. cruising delay (min)
Base scenario PHT = 45,337 4660 0 3.7
Constant pricing 1211 (2.7%) 2641 45.8% 1.9
Strategy P1-A 6990 (15.4%) 5857 119.5% 1.2
Strategy P1-B 7092 (15.6%) 9800 72.4% 1.1
Strategy P2 5944 (13.0%) 7207 82.5% 1.4red line in the middle represents the travel time before cruising starts, while the distance between the dashed red line and
the solid blue line at the bottom, represents the duration of cruising. Comparing the result under P1-A (Fig. 8(b)) with the one
under constant pricing Fig. 8(a), it is clear that both the total delay and the delay caused by cruising are better controlled when
P1-A is applied. The reduction in delay is especially high during peak-hour (when travel time before cruising gets larger). The
performance under strategy P2 shows similar effectiveness in congestion and cruising control as P1-A. Note that the curves of
strategy P2 are not as smooth as the ones of P1-A. This is because traﬃc states ﬂuctuate during peak-hour due to congestion,
while P2 is state-responsive. Nevertheless these results indicate that P2 can maintain an equally eﬃcient mobility level without
demand or mode choice information.
4.4. Eﬃciency evaluation of the pricing schemes
In this subsection, the eﬃciency of the pricing strategies is evaluated. We compare the system costs among the ﬁve pricing
strategies mentioned above. The following performance indicators are measured: the savings in total person hours travelled
(sPHT) compared to the base scenario, the total toll paid (TTP, converted to time unit with a mean value-of-time of 16 $/h), the
toll eﬃciency which is the ratio between sPHT and the corresponding TTP, and the average cruising delay which is the total delay
time divided by total amount of on-street parkers. The statistics are summarized in Table 2.
The base scenario applies a ﬂat rate to garage parking only, while on-street is free. On-street parking is highly desired at
ﬁrst, as parking on-street experiences less cost until the cruising time cost increases to garage pricing rate. However due to
the large demand for on-street parking, it becomes full and results on average a 3.7 min cruising delay for the later travelers.
Users then have to choose garage parking and pay for the ﬁxed high toll. For the studied network, the average travel time per
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Fig. 8. Oblique plot of the dynamics of the traﬃc going for on-street parking under the three pricing strategies: (a) Constant pricing, (b, bottom left) Strategy
P1-A, and (c, bottom right) strategy P2. Following the oblique dotted gray lines, travel time and cruising time can be estimated.trip is 6 mins under free-ﬂow condition and around 15 mins when the congestion starts to grow. A 3.7 min cruising time is a
relatively considerable amount (more than 50% of the free ﬂow travel time). Limited improvement in PHT can be found when
ﬂat-rate tolls are implemented and optimized for both garage and on-street parking. From an eﬃciency point of view, however,
the constant-pricing strategy makes users pay about two times more than their gain in travel time, reﬂected by the eﬃciency
rate of 45.8%.
Applying the feedback Strategy P2, it is observed that the PHT signiﬁcantly decreases by 13%. The resultant toll eﬃciency is
around 80% albeit a 120% can be obtained by utilizing the strategy P1-A. Recall that P1-A is obtained from full optimization by
minimizing both the total travel time and the parking toll cost, while P1-B produces optimal prices minimizing only the total
travel time. Comparing P1-A and P1-B, while the sPHT is nearly identical, the eﬃciencies of the two strategies are completely
different. This result highlights the importance of considering the total cost for travelers when optimizing pricing schemes.
Regarding the difference between P1 and P2, the cruising delays under both P1-type strategies slightly outweigh strategy P2.
Regarding the eﬃciency ratio, the difference can be explained as follows. Since strategy P2 is feedback responsive, controllers
(9) and (10) do not exclusively consider congestion evolution. On the other side, strategy P1 is able to predict and adapt traﬃc
conditions and set optimal tolls to trigger an early mode shift as the whole optimization horizon is considered. As mentioned-
above, a slight mode shift during the on-set of peak-hour could lead to substantial improvement. While strategy P1 is diﬃcult
to implement in reality as it requires future predictions, strategy P2 is a promising pricing scheme for ﬁeld operation which also
leads to an improved system performance, with respect to cruising delay and toll eﬃciency. Under P2, the prices are determined
based on real-time monitoring and the required data are easily observable with the existing technologies (e.g. loop detectors,
GPS, Bluetooth etc.). A careful analysis of historical data can possibly make this feasible pricing strategy more eﬃcient, through
a model predictive control approach where uncertainty of congestion evolution will be treated in the control horizon. This is a
challenging but interesting future direction.
Time-dependent parking-rate represents the current mainstream parking price management in urban areas, though the rates
may be determined based on different criteria. As aforementioned, the public-owned parking facilities in the city of San Francisco
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article).operate demand-responsive parking pricing which updates the prices at a monthly or shorter basis to reduce cruising time.
Strategies P2 attempts to employ such pricing mechanism with a second objective to reduce general congestion. The result
shows that the strategy indeed effectively reduces the total PHT and average cruising time. Strategy P1-A demonstrates higher
eﬃciency thanks to the opportunities of adapting the changing conditions of both the users and the parking prices.
We also investigate the performance of P2 strategy if users are receiving imperfect information during their mode choices.
Thanks to the current development on information technology, travelers may obtain real-time traﬃc information via smart-
phone applications, advanced traveler’s systems, radios, etc. Provided the most updated traﬃc information, smart mode choices
(including parking facility choice) can be made to avoid extra travel cost. In practice, however, users may not be able to make
choices rationally based on the most recent travel cost. A certain time lag exists between congestion and information propaga-
tion and the reaction from the users who enter the network. To this end, we examine if our pricing schemes can adapt to this
time lag. We create scenarios where travelers make mode choices based on instantaneous travel and cruising times estimated in
the beginning of their trip versus the actual travel time experienced. We obtain a constant pricing through optimization, and a
P2 pricing. Comparing to the scenarios where users determine mode choices based only on the current condition (as shown in
Table 2), larger amounts of toll are required to control the level of congestion. The mode share of buses falls down about 5%
during the on-set of congestion while rises about 10% during the off-set of congestion, as users realize the change of travel con-
dition much later. As a result, the maximum accumulations are higher and congestion preserves longer. The eﬃciency ratios for
constant pricing and P2 are 40% and 75%, respectively. Evidently, the reduction in eﬃciency ratio is small. These results imply
that though users may not make smart choices in reality due to the lack of information on congestion, feedback pricing indeed
can serve as a strong management measure to minimize extra congestion.
4.5. Parking pricing competition
Now let us discuss the system performance in a competitive environment where the two parking operators are non-
cooperative. Firstly, we apply a standard bi-objective optimization procedure to obtain the eﬃcient frontier satisfying both objec-
tive functions (11a) and (11b). Two scale parameters valued (0, 1) are given to the two objective functions respectively, where the
sum of the two parameters equals to 1. A single-objective optimization is then formulated and different Pareto optimal solutions
are produced.
The blue scatter curve in Fig. 9(a) below displays the eﬃcient frontier of this problem. Given this eﬃcient frontier the poten-
tial combination of management pricing policies can be readily estimated. Secondly, we illustrate the evolution of competition as
described in Fig. 9(b) starting from the three strategies P1-A, P1-B and P2, as initial points, which are below the eﬃcient frontier
in Fig. 9(a). The complex dynamics of the developed problem does not allow for analytical derivations of Stackelberg equilibrium.
Nevertheless, it is expected that a solution close to the equilibrium is obtained with small error (even if existence or uniqueness
cannot be proved). The red dots mark the solutions obtained in the previous subsection while the green dots indicate the point
of convergence. It is interesting to observe that competition can help both operators achieve larger beneﬁt if the competition
originates from P1-B and P2. If the competition starts from P1-A, the garage operator would end up beneﬁting from the compe-
tition. Meanwhile, the city operator would get slightly worseoff. Detailed evolution of the competition under P1-A is displayed
in Fig. 9(b), which shows that a long-term convergence (agreement) can be reached for the two operators after approximately
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Fig. 10. The contour plots of the normalized PHT values for (a, left) P2 strategy and (b, right) constant pricing under different parking capacity splits between
on-street and garage, and different total parking capacities.10–15 iterations. While the competition converges in solutions close to the eﬃcient frontier, governmental regulations or garage
subsidization could help the system to operate at a lower TPC value.
5. Policy discussion on storage capacity and parking duration
In the ﬁnal part of the paper, we provide a discussion on how storage capacity of parking and limit of parking duration inﬂu-
ence the dynamics of a multimodal system and how pricing can serve as a supplementary policy to parking space management.
Recent research toward this direction can be found in Arnott et al. (2015) who evaluate the effect of on-street parking capacity,
duration and pricing on the cruising behavior in congested city centers. In our analysis, we show that urban networks can be
operated by proper pricing strategies. In particular, our discussion demonstrates that pricing functions powerfully even when
parking storage capacity decreases and cruising delay increases. We will focus on the performance of the P2 strategy which
employs the feedback congestion-responsive controller for determining a timely-dynamic pricing. While P1-A functions supe-
riorly under ﬁxed demand scenario, it should be highlighted that the P2 strategy deals with congestion more effectively when
demand is uncertain and ﬂuctuates, which implies a substantial potential for practical applications. Our numerical tests conﬁrm
this statement. The discussion of this section will provide policy indications on urban parking management through pricing and
space allocation.
5.1. Capacity share between on-street and garage parking
Up to now, we assume unlimited storage capacity for garages while ﬁxed capacity for on-street parking. In this subsection,
we attempt to extend our analysis on paring capacity, and to investigate the impact of different capacity share between the two
parking facilities on traﬃc performance and pricing.
To this end, we set up a base scenario where the total parking space capacity accommodates 24,000 vehicle units, including
19,000 units for on-street parking and 5000 units for garage. We examine system performances of different cases in two dimen-
sions, wherewe vary: the unit split of the two parking facilities (percentage of the units), and the total space units (total capacity).
Please note that when the parking units of on-street decreases, we consider a ﬁxed percentage of these spaces becomes available
for road space usage, e.g. more lanes or wider lanes. In another word, the total space of road and on-street parking is assumed to
be constant.
We apply P2 strategy and constant pricing to each of the cases, and estimate the total travel time (PHT). The results are
illustrated by contour plots and displayed in Fig. 10, where the PHTs are projected over the (total capacity, capacity split) plane.
Recall that the (24,000, 80%) is the base case. We assign value 1 to the PHT of the base case, then normalize the PHTs of all cases
by dividing the PHT value to the one of the base case.
The following observations should be highlighted from Fig. 10: (i) When on-street parking capacity is limited, P2 strategy
is much more effective than the constant pricing. Note that a case with (20,000, 60%) decreases the number of on-street spots
by 37.5% (from 19,200 to 12,000 spots) and the total spots by 20%, but with the eﬃcient P2 pricing, network delays increase by
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Fig. 11. The contour plots of the normalized average prices during peak-hour of P2 strategy, (a, left) garage parking and (b, right) on-street parking.only 5%. For the constant pricing case, delays increase by 30%; (ii) Applying P2 strategy, there exists an rigid lower bound for
the parking units of on-street (the boundary line between the light and dark blue), beyond which the total PHT does not change
over the total parking capacities; (iii) Beyond the frontier, increasing the storage capacity does not improve traﬃc conditions.
This holds even when higher prices are enforced; and (iv) PHT increases signiﬁcantly when the total capacity decreases below
a certain level, especially when the share of on-street parking units is low. Furthermore, the resultant mode shift indicates that
travelers prefer to switch from on-street parking to garage parking, rather than from cars to buses. For example, when capacity
share of on-street drops from 80% to 20%, only 10% of travelers change modes to buses while nearly 60% of the car users switch
to garage parking.
In Fig. 11, the contour plots of the average prices during peak-hour are displayed, when P2 strategy is applied. It can be
seen that, the prices for both facilities become high when (i) the total capacity decreases, which is logical as ﬁnding parking is
more and more time-consuming and costly; and (ii) when the share of on-street parking decreases, in particular the on-street
parking price increases signiﬁcantly, which is also reasonable in order to keep the PHTs as low as possible. Note that in situations
of limited parking, on-street parking might be more expensive than garage parking. We will show in more details how traﬃc
dynamics and system performances are inﬂuenced under such high prices, in a later subsection.
A few policy indications can be interpreted from these results. Firstly, smart parking management should combine capacity
planning with pricing, thus saving an important fraction of the limited urban space serving the transportation system. Many
cities attempt to build garages in the urban centers, aiming at attracting parking demand and reducing cruising and congestion.
Our results indicate that this is not always the proper decision. It is important for cities to identify a possible optimal frontier,
and then adjust the share of the capacity split based on their goal of mobility level. Secondly, the improvement in the service
of the alternative modes is necessary for the success of parking management. For example if the total collected toll can be
utilized to enhance the performance of the buses, pricing would trigger even higher mode shift and achieve greater eﬃciency
in reducing general delay as well as cruising delay. Recall that, we do not allocate the on-street parking capacity fully to road
spaces, which means that those spaces can be possibly utilized for infrastructure of pedestrians and cyclists (that can further
reduce congestion).
As shown in the previous subsection, themagnitude of storage capacity signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the prices of on-street parking.
The dynamic pricing strategy P2 is able to respond to capacity limitations and demand ﬂuctuations, in order to help maintain
certain mobility levels (e.g. not exceeding a certain total PHT). Dynamic schemes have already been implemented in cities, such
as in the downtown of San Francisco. Shoup (2006) argued that many American cities underprice on-street parking, where the
rationale is to use obligatory cruising to rule out user’s preference on on-street parking. On-street parking is priced cheap on
purpose, attracting large amount of demand. Eventually all on-street parking will be full or highly occupied such that there will
be no incentive for people to cruise but to park in garage. Such policy aims at maintaining a high utilization rate of parking space
(e.g. as long as there is an empty space, it will be ﬁlled immediately), and redistributing users over different modes through a
day-to-day type of learning. However, cruising delay cannot be eliminated or signiﬁcantly decreased under such pricing scheme.
Therefore, underpricing may not be as eﬃcient as strategies P1 and P2. This is because underpricing on-street parking brings
longer cruising, and enforces the users pay higher parking prices as they need to go to garage. On the other hand, overpricing
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Fig. 12. Evolution of (a, top left) on-street parking occupancy over time, and (b, top right) cruising delay over time, under different on-street parking capacities;
Comparison of (c, down left) total cost TPC and total travel time PHT over different on-street parking storage capacities, and (d, down right) average mode share
of bus, by solid lines, and average share of garage parking over different on-street parking storage capacities, under three pricing scenarios: Basic, P1-A and P2.(e.g. by P1-B) is indeed effective in congestion reduction (as via mode shift). However it cancels out the saving from travel time
and results a higher total user cost.
Some policy makers might advocate allocating more space to on-street parking in order to mitigate delay caused by cruising.
However this may not be an optimal strategy. From parking operational point of view, we have conﬁrmed this point in the
previous section. From a global city planning point of view, as urban road space is limited in the city center, allocating more
space for parking means for example demanding space from the dedicated bus lanes. Thus, space-allocation and -reallocation
should take into account the space competition among different modes that may share the total road space, and quantitative
evaluations shall be carried out, e.g. through an optimization process proposed in Guler and Cassidy (2012) for link level or
in Zheng and Geroliminis (2013) for network level. Space re-allocation may be expensive to implement or even an infeasible
solution. Furthermore, adapting space allocation to demand ﬂuctuation is diﬃcult and unsustainable. Pricing such as the ones
designed in this paper therefore can serve as a supplementary strategy under capacity limitation, by triggering mode choice shift
including parking facility choices.
5.2. Storage capacity of on-street parking
To this end, we investigate in more details how parking capacity inﬂuences traﬃc dynamics, mode share, and pricing. In
particular, we focus on on-street parking. We utilize the base scenario where the total parking capacity and split are (24,000,
80%), and obtain the system performances under another four scenarios: no change (denoted as 0%), 5%, 10% and 15% deduction
of on-street parking space. The dynamics under pricing strategy P1-A are simulated and results of three scenarios are displayed in
Figs. 12(a) and 12(b). P1-A is re-optimized for each of the scenarios. It can be seen that the maximum occupancy in all scenarios
goes up to 90%. By comparing the slopes of the three curves between occupancy values of 30% and 90%, we observe that storage
capacity inﬂuences how fast the maximum occupancy rate is reached. The more the capacity is provided, the less drastic the
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Fig. 13. The MFDs of different parking duration limits (a, left) under the dynamic strategy P2, and (b, right) comparison of the pricing rates of P2 between cases
of parking duration 45 min and 60 min.occupancy increases. If we compare the reductions of occupancy rate after time 11 h for the three scenarios, we can ﬁnd that the
larger the capacity, the faster the system recovers from the overcrowding of on-street parking during the off-set of the peak hour.
Fig. 12(b) compares cruising delay under the three scenarios. As the capacity decreases, car-users experience higher cruising
delays for longer duration, but not too longer. Low on-street availability causes longer cruising distance. Travel speed decreases,
which is a result of the accumulation of cruising vehicles. Consequently, larger cruising delay would be experienced. Though the
change of occupancy follows a similar pattern, it is shown in the ﬁgure that the average cruising delay for case “P1 -15%” is about
0.5 min larger than that of “P1” and “P1 -5%”. Furthermore, the cruising-for-parking phenomenon lasts longer when capacity
decreases, which correspond to what we observed in Fig. 12(a).
Then we estimate total travel time PHT, the average mode share of bus and the average share of garage parking for the four
scenarios mentioned above. We compare these performance indicators under three pricing strategies: Basic pricing (recall this is
a constant pricing without optimization), P1-A pricing, and P2 pricing. The results are illustrated in Fig. 12(c). It can be observed
that PHT vary within 4% as storage capacity gradually decreases, while the total cost TPC follows the same pattern (not shown).
This is promising result as it indicates that (I) proper pricing can maintain equivalent of level system performance even when
storage capacity is reduced by certain percentage, and (II) the real-time pricing strategy P2 shows similar eﬃciency to strategy
P1-A. If this space would be allocated to improve public transport services, further improvements and higher public transport
mode shares could be observed. What is interesting about argument (I) is that one may expect PHT signiﬁcantly increase when
capacity decreases and Fig. 12(b) actually conﬁrms that the cruising time becomes larger. This indeed would be the case, if users
had no other mode choices but car with on-street parking. As proper pricing redistributes effectively the demand for car usage
and on-street parking usage overall system performance is not inﬂuenced. Fig. 12(c) compares the average mode share of bus
(ωb
i
) and the average garage share (ωc
g,i
). While both shares exhibit a tendency of increase, garage attracts more trips than public
transport. This could be inﬂuenced if the decrease for on-street parking would be better utilized for public transport. As garage
parking requires no cruising, saving in PHT can be expected. This saving would compensate the increase in cruising delay for
users still going for on-street parking, thus explains the slight variation observed in Fig. 12(c).
5.3. Allow a shorter or longer parking duration?
The amount of available parking spaces depends not only on the physical storage capacity of the parking facilities, but also
on parking duration which regulates the amount of time a user can occupy a parking space. With users reaching their duration
limit and re-departing, available parking spaces are generated dynamically. A shorter duration enforces a higher departure rate
from parking spaces, thus leading to more accessible parking conditions. However on the other hand, such conditions can attract
higher amount of car users that result higher cruising ﬂow and congestion. A relevant policy question should be answered then
is how parking duration limit affects the ﬂow dynamics.
To this end, we modify the parking duration limits for on-street parking by ± 25% (45 min and 75 min), and we estimate the
P2 prices for these two cases. The resultant MFDs are displayed in Fig. 13(a), together with the MFD of the 60min-case (Fig. 7(b)).
Overall, the MFDs show that congestion can be suﬃciently controlled (accumulations are below the critical value), under the
different parking duration restrictions. The total PHTs for the three cases are which are nearly identical, within 0.5% difference.
To achieve this, higher pricing rates are applied in the cases of 45 min and 75 min, comparing to the base case of 60 min. Under
short-duration allowance, users tend to prefer on-street parking because parking spaces are more frequently available. Higher
pricing rates are required in order to force mode shift to avoid overcrowding of cruising and congestion. The time series of the
pricing rates displayed in Fig. 13(b) verify this statement. While when long-duration is allowed, higher pricing is obtained as
well. For the sake of visibility, we do not plot the pricing time series of the 75 min case, which are similar to the case of 45 min.
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are also found (47%, 45% and 50% for 45min, 60min, and 75min respectively), which
is due to the augment of travel cost from pricing and cruising time.
Note that some scatters can be observed below the MFD of 75 min. It is caused by the extremely low on-street parking
availability, which limits the trip completion rate of the whole region.
Note also that we focus on the scenarios of ﬁxed parking duration (similar consideration can be found e.g. in Arnott et al.
(2015) in our study. Integrating stochasticity in our model, i.e. assuming parking duration follows a certain distribution, is more
challenging as the ﬁrst in-ﬁrst out rule is violated. It however would complicate the system dynamics and exceed the scope of
this study. We aim to investigate this subject more carefully in future work.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we proposed a macroscopic approach for modeling multi-modal traﬃc system with parking limitation and
cruising-for-parking ﬂow. Parking limitation was integrated in the developed multi-modal system model, where vehicles need
to cruise for parking before reaching their destination. The time of cruising was estimated by assuming the probability of ﬁnding
a parking space follows a geometric distribution and depends on the dynamic parking availability. The effect of cruising on
the global performance, e.g. the average speed, was also captured, by the MFD dynamics. A case study was carried out in a
two-region bi-modal network. Two parking choices were considered: (i) limited on-street parking requiring cruising, and (ii)
unlimited garage parking with higher parking fee but no cruising cost. We then utilized the system model to test two network-
level parking pricing strategies. Strategy P1 was obtained through optimization of the total travel cost (PHT + parking fee, P1-A)
or total travel time (PHT only, P1-B). Under this strategy, the prices were determined with long-term impact taking into account
and therefore the pricing scheme is highly eﬃcient. Strategy P2 adapted a feedback-type controller for determining the parking
price, which was congestion- and parking availability-dependent. This pricing strategy helped maintain traﬃc performance at
desired (controlled) levels. Furthermore, it was promising that this strategy, which can be implemented in real-time, was closely
eﬃcient as Strategy P1. Following these results, we investigated the competition behavior and system performance, when the
authorities of on-street and garage parking belong to different operators whomanage the prices with different objectives. Results
of cooperative-competition via a bi-objective optimization and a selﬁsh-competition via a bi-level optimization were presented.
It was found that competition could not improve the beneﬁt of neither of the operators, compared to cooperative strategies, such
as P1 or P2. Finally, we discussed the impact of the on-street parking storage capacity on system dynamics. We showed even if
the capacity decreases for 30%, pricing strategy such as P2 can keep PHT at similar level. We also found that system performance
could be well maintained under capacity reduction, when the proposed pricing strategies were applied and triggered mode
shift from car to bus, and from on-street parking to garage. Pricing can support smart space allocation through a comprehensive
optimization procedure, where the effect of multi-mode traﬃc is considered.
On-going work extends the investigation on the eﬃciency of parking management under pricing competition. Not all aspects
of modeling have been validated until now due to lack of detailed data, as for example the parking model where empirical study
will be carried out for model veriﬁcation and parameter calibration. Empirical studies should be also planned on the identiﬁca-
tion of the start of cruising, utilizing data such as GPS records. Furthermore, the current treatment of cruising is dimensionless,
meaning that the cruising cost is estimated without identifying the detailed routes of cruising. Such consideration aims at the
average cost at system level and ignores the cruising possibilities at disaggregated level. Nevertheless, large spatial heterogeneity
is not expected given the spatial correlations in the distribution of congestion and well-deﬁned bi-modal MFD can be developed
for more complex city structures. A multi-region analysis with a consideration of multiple parking facilities with limited avail-
ability should be a research priority. One additional complexity might be that multiple regions with parking limitations would
require the addition of a location choice model, with additional cost components (accessibility, distance from the destination,
etc.).
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